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Lisa "Not Invented Here" Dusseault
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Thursday, October 01, 2009
How obviously wrong are Roman Polanski's defenders? Heck, even Nina Burleigh, of all people, recognizes that "[w]hat matters is that the rape of a 13-year old girl, in a nation of laws".
She does concede, however, that "Great Men - and other men - sometimes do find pliant, young flesh irresistible. Geniuses are usually forgiven for it." Well, she would know, wouldn't she? (0) comments Saturday, August 08, 2009
The latest proof of the extent to which an aristocratic, ruling-class mindset has permeated the political left and its cultural allies is Ellen Ruppel Shell's new bestseller, "Cheap: The High Cost of Discount Culture", which might as well be subtitled, "Let Them Eat Cake". It should no longer surprise anyone that a magazine writer with impeccable liberal credentials would casually accuse ordinary price-conscious shoppers of political ignorance, social irresponsibility and cultural philistinism, although I admit I would never have expected her to denounce, of all things, IKEA, the savior of many an impecunious urban snob--the Trader Joe's of furniture, if you will. (Perhaps the secret of IKEA has finally gotten out to the masses, ruining its cachet.)
What does surprise me, though, is the timing of this broadside against middle-class frugality. Sure, Eric Schlosser's Fast Food Nation could ooze contempt for the unwashed peasantry and their appalling affinity for inexpensive, convenient, tasty food--in 2001, when even those who'd dropped a bundle in the tech crash had little reason to feel particularly vulnerable. But in these difficult economic times, is there really still such a large cohort of readers so insulated from financial concerns that they feel no discomfort while sharing Shell's snooty disdain for ordinary folks and their crude habit of saving money by shopping for the best deal? (2) comments Saturday, July 04, 2009
Let's say you're the "supreme leader" of a large Asian country ruled by a party with a radical ideology based on a belief system that predicts that the entire world will one day submit to its precepts. Your charismatic predecessor led the overthrow of the nation's ruling monarchy and anointed you as his successor, but the regime you inherited retained some inconvenient vestiges of liberalism and some annoyingly unsubservient members of the ruling party--not to mention plenty of popular discontent. Now, with the help of the loyal thugs of your government's repressive apparatus, you've finally eliminated those remnants of liberalism and isolated and demoted your main rivals. What do you do next?
Well, if history is any guide, you launch a massive purge of your own party and all institutions with the potential to foster leaders or ideas that might challenge your absolute rule. This will certainly cement your hold on power for a while (as well as boost your personality cult), but it'll make your subjects' lives pretty miserable in the process. So if anyone out there happens to be living in a country that fits this description, now might be a good time to get out... (0) comments Monday, June 08, 2009
Should doctors be using computers?, Part 2
I discussed here the complaint by the New York Times about the administration's "headlong rush" towards the computerization of medical records. That was the Bush administration of course, and we all still have the whiplash to show for it. By contrast, Obama recently held a health-care summit at which "the flagship proposal ... was the national adoption of electronic medical records". This time it is the Wall Street Journal that is concerned. Apparently there is no reason to believe that computers should be used for medical records, any more than they were in the writing of that article. And of course, once mistaken medical decisions are committed to computer, they will tend to propagate. Perhaps we'd be better off if doctors wrote nothing down. (I do agree with the article, however, that this proposal will not yield great savings.) Interestingly, the New York Times is not (or at least was not) completely on board. It appears that some democrats want to make sure that the privacy issues are completely settled first. Right. A friend of mine also feels that privacy issues must be perfected before we go ahead: "Just think about how bad a person with AIDS would feel if his medical information became public." This is true, of course, but I pointed out that there is another group of people for whom it is absolutely crucial that medical records be computerized: people with AIDS. It all comes down to the fact that there are two types of people in the world: those who think that people with AIDS primarily have a privacy problem, and those who think that people with AIDS primarily have a medical problem. It should be clear that any system that makes it easier for good guys to access (medical) data will also make it at least somewhat easier for bad guys to access it as well. That is, we will lose at least some privacy when we computerize medical records. Also, in the initial version of the system, there will be horrible bugs; with time these will be decreased, but the system will never be perfect in any sense. I think it's worth it. If you don't, then you should explain just what degree of disorganization and inaccessibility you desire for medical records. An interesting question is: why has this computerization not happened already? Surely the privacy-mongers are partly to blame, but there are many other reasons as well. Two culprits are the medical profession, and facts of life about how standards come about. I hope to write more about this in the future. (1) comments Monday, May 25, 2009
According to virtually every press account, the recent credit card law means trouble for customers who pay their balances in full every month. Deprived of extra profits from interest rate increases on heavy debtors, the logic goes, credit card companies will have to recoup the extra revenue from non-balance-carriers. Some commentators even go so far as to argue that monthly interest payers are "subsidizing" everyone else, and that the decline in revenue from the former will have to be made up by making the latter pay their "fair share".
Arguments of this type pop up every time something negative happens to the credit card industry. Yet here we are, with annual fees hovering around zero--often with "cash back" rebates of one percent or more--for customers who pay off their balances. If credit card companies could get away with charging balance-free customers annual fees, then why don't they already? In fact, the supposed free ride enjoyed by non-borrowers is a product of two factors:
Neither of these factors is at all affected by the latest legislation. It's therefore a good bet that any future attempts on the part of the credit card companies to squeeze more money from low-risk customers will be feeble, short-lived and unsuccessful. (0) comments Wednesday, February 25, 2009
The Madoff affair--in which prestigious Jewish financier Bernard Madoff bilked investors, many of them observant fellow Jews and Jewish foundations, out of billions of dollars via an elaborate, long-lived Ponzi scheme--is a fascinating lesson in the nature and evolution of social trust. Even before Edward Banfield made it a topic of social scientific research, the idea that the degree to which a society's members can trust each other affects their economic, social and political well-being was a matter of common sense. Recent popularizers such as Francis Fukuyama and John Kay have focused on the role of culturally nurtured social trust in economic prosperity, with Amy Chua (about whom I've written previously) concentrating on the economic success of certain minority populations.
One such population, of course, is the Jewish people, and the Madoff scandal illustrates the extent to which Jewish success is a result of what Fukuyama would call a "high-trust" culture, where norms and traditions cause members to expect and rely on high standards of behavior from each other. There is a downside to these expectations, though: Madoff was able to bilk so many people out of so much money precisely because they considered it implausible that someone so deeply embedded in, and respected by, the Jewish community could be such a crook. This sort of "affinity fraud" is a familiar weakness of trust based on cultural norms. Trust is inherently brittle: the more weight it carries--that is, the greater the reliance that is placed in it--the greater the temptation for a Madoff type to come along and betray it for his own gain. Back in the days of family-owned banks and letters of introduction, for example, Madoff might have been able to wipe out the life savings of a few relatives and gullible acquaintances. But in an age of highly portable capital and global commerce, inhabited by much larger, richer networks of trust, Madoff was able to tap into, and ultimately destroy, an amount of wealth equivalent to the annual GDP of a small country. And here's where Madoff's other cultural affiliation comes into play. America is exceptional in many ways, but one of them is that among high-trust cultures, it's the least rooted in cultural norms, traditions and expectations. As the world's most culturally diverse, individualistic and libertarian nation, it simply cannot, and collectively has no desire to, cultivate in its inhabitants the kind of rigid adherence to reliable behavioral norms that's inculcated in, say, every Japanese. Instead, America has built a remarkable infrastructure of trust out of a combination of private institutions and governmental regulations that effectively substitute for cultural norms as a way of mediating trust between parties that wouldn't otherwise trust each other. Consider, for example, that quintessential American institution, the credit card. With it, an American can walk into an office thousands of miles from home and buy or rent very valuable goods--a luxury car, for instance--from a total stranger, without so much as a downpayment. Yet the card represents no personal acquaintance to speak of, either between the cardholder and the issuer, the issuer and the merchant's acquirer, or the merchant's acquirer and the merchant. The bonds that restrain their behavior are rather a combination of laws, commercial practices and incentives that successfully convince the participants--most of the time--that obeying the rules of the credit card game is in their interest. Obviously, this type of behavioral restraint is less effective than the social norms of other high-trust societies, as America's stratospheric rates of crime, bankruptcy, lawsuits and other forms of conflict demonstrate. But its flexibility and libertarian commercialism seem to make it more efficient--in the dynamic modern world, at least--than trust based on tradition and social norms. In much of the world, in fact, financial structures have gradually been pulled towards American styles of operation, rather than vice versa. On the other hand, the brittleness of trust doesn't go away just because it's mediated by commercial institutions rather than social norms. What affinity fraud has been to high-trust societies, financial bubbles have been to American-style economic trust systems. And the longer and more large-scale the mutual trust gets, the more catastrophic the shattering. The recent (and ongoing) financial crisis , for example, apparently culminated in a massive run on money market funds. Money market funds are, of course, largely unregulated, uninsured funds that store trillions in ordinary depositors' money--money that could instead have been stored in government-guaranteed deposit accounts at banks. (Those government guarantees, let us remember, were put into place after similar runs on banks during the early 1930s.) Apparently, millions of depositors trusted the funds enough to prefer their higher returns to the comfortable security of government-guaranteed bank deposits--and would have collectively lost trillions of dollars as a result, had the government not intervened to protect them. Lulled into a collective overextension of trust, these investors came close to having their trust instantaneously and utterly destroyed--with all the inevitable economic consequences such a drastic drop in social trust can be expected to bring. I've explained previously how expectations of continued economic prosperity can undermine that same prosperity. The effect of trust is similar: a continued boom inflates social trust, increasing the opportunities for exploiting it, until it suddenly shatters, leaving society much the worse off economically. As we observe the twin wrecks of a housing system built on trust in homebuyers' reliability, and a retirement savings system built on trust in the stock market's reliability, we would do well to remember that trust is as subject to bubble dynamics as any other valuable commodity. (0) comments Tuesday, January 20, 2009
A group of seventy-odd British residents "of Jewish origin" have written a letter to the Guardian comparing Gaza to the Warsaw Ghetto, and urging British sanctions against Israel. No doubt they are highly atypical of their self-declared demographic, but then, out of a population of some 280,000, one could no doubt find seventy to endorse just about any point of view, including the view that Israel is treating Gaza too harshly, and should be punished for it.
But I find it fascinating that they felt compelled to identify their "Jewish origin" in their letter. Why should their ethnic roots matter? Would a group of seventy or so Americans of British origin ever get together to express their opposition to British policy? Do critics of the Chinese government who happen to be of Chinese descent (as opposed to, say, Chinese birth or citizenship) like to call attention to that fact? Indeed, it's a good bet that the Guardian letter's signatories are predominantly secular leftists who disdain Judaism as a relic of arcane superstitions, consider Jewish peoplehood a reactionary chauvinism impeding international solidarity, and condemn Israel as a colonialist imperialist outpost. In other words, in any other circumstances, they'd take great pains to minimize the significance of their Jewish heritage. Why, then, would they mention it so prominently here? The answer, I believe, has to do with one of the more minor, less well-known costs of the Holocaust: while powerfully discrediting (to say the least) anti-Semitism, it has also implicitly raised the bar, so to speak, for anti-Semites. Whereas previous Jew-hatred was founded on libels about Jewish religion, culture, moral character or group behavior, the Nazis went a step further, concocting elaborate theories of Jewish genetic inferiority. As a result, many classic anti-Semitic slurs--such as, say, conspiracy theories positing various Jewish plots to achieve world domination--have actually come to seem somewhat milder by comparison, to the point where their modern promulgators often straight-facedly claim that they're not really anti-Semitic at all, since they make no genetic claims about Jews. (One obnoxious commenter here at ICBW, for example, tried this tack, apparently in all sincerity.) It is in this context that the Guardian letter writers' assertion of Jewish origin makes sense. If extreme hostility towards Israel is widely associated with anti-Semitism, and anti-Semitism is is widely associated with a belief in Jewish genetic inferiority, then rabid critics of Israel might be expected to attempt to insulate themselves against charges of anti-Semitism by identifying their own Jewish genetic heritage. In effect, they're saying, "Hitler would consider us Jewish--so when we say we think Israel is behaving like Hitler, you can believe us." Perhaps they should stop letting Hitler set the standard for so many of their moral distinctions. (2) comments Wednesday, December 31, 2008
Well, it's that time of year again. Here's my annual assessment of the previous year's predictions, and a futile attempt to do better this year:
Well, she would have, if her staff had been competent enough to pay attention to those caucus states...
The very first part was off, but the rest was on target.
Again, on target with the exception of one key detail (Musharraf's fate).
It was touch and go there for much of the year, and he's of course on his way out, but darned if he isn't hanging on to the bitter end, and charging into Gaza--almost as if to validate my prediction with his last ounce of strength...
Rather too optimistic about the economy, but I figure I'm in pretty good company on that one, and possibly more on target than most prognosticators. Also, correct on the direction (if not always the magnitude) of the movements of the stock market, oil, housing and the dollar.
Not this year (that I noticed), but then, I'm always ahead of the curve on these things... And now for this year's reckless forecasts:
As always, past performance is no guarantee of future results, although it's pretty good evidence that this blog's name is no idle boast... (0) comments Sunday, December 14, 2008
I've already noted that the extraordinarily successful are a poor choice of model for those who would understand how to achieve more mundane varieties of success in life. Now, along comes Malcolm Gladwell to devote an entire book to this poor choice, studying a few off-the-charts-successful cases such as Mozart and Bill Gates in order to try to understand how people in general manage to succeed. And his conclusion, apparently, is that the most successful people may well have all been extraordinarily talented, but they have also all been extraordinarily lucky. Gladwell draws the standard luck egalitarian conclusions from this supposed insight.
Much discussion has ensued in the blogosphere, all of it completely missing the point. Of course the most extremely successful people have all been extremely lucky--just as they've all been extremely talented, and extremely hardworking. That's precisely why they've succeeded far beyond the ranks of competitors who only excelled in two or fewer of these three respects. The far more interesting question is what proportions of luck, talent and work typically contribute to the kind of moderate success that sensible, realistic people aspire to achieve. In those cases, I strongly suspect, talent and dedication weigh far more heavily than luck. Then again, that's probably not the kind of study that would help make Malcolm Gladwell the spectacularly successful writer that he's become. (0) comments
Yossi Klein Halevi and Matthew Wagner have both written lately about the remarkable relationship between Chabad/Lubavitch and secular Israelis. Unlike other ultra-Orthodox sects, which all coldly reject both the state of Israel and secular Israelis as betrayers of Jewish law and observance, Chabad considers itself a kind of internal missionary organization, winning over secular Jews to piety through good works and generosity.
Unfortunately, Chabad's missionary service is rooted in essentially the same messianism as Christian missionaries': they believe that winning Jews back to observance hastens the coming of the Messiah. Ultimately, that motive can't sustain a generic service ethic, because it inevitably draws the missionaries towards more susceptible recruitment targets, such as the poor and the distressed. (Christian missionaries, for example, certainly follow this pattern.) It's possible, though, that Chabad (or perhaps an offshoot, or a rival sect) could gradually evolve its beliefs in a way capable of sustaining its passion for serving fellow Jews in general. All it would require is a subtle shift away from believing in the need to convert all Jews to its brand of piety, and towards believing in its members' need to maintain its own brand of piety--including its practice of helping all Jews--as an end in itself. I believe that such a shift would be of enormous benefit to the Jewish people. For the truth is that the fanatically observant, the fanatically secular, and the broad spectrum in between are all parts of a far stronger whole than any single one of those groups would be on its own. Other religions have discovered this, and typically maintain a pious class--priests, monks, monastics, and so on--that is respected for its dedication and service to its correligionists, but understood to coexist with a more worldly majority, rather than rejecting it. Already, ultra-Orthodox Jews in general act as a kind of priestly class among Jews, devoting themselves entirely to study and piety at the cost of living on charity, and typically in poverty. They also perform a number of purely religious services to the community, such as recovering bodies for ritual burial (most famously after terrorist attacks). Unfortunately, rather than consider themselves a kind of spiritual elite serving a larger Jewish nation, they tend to view other Jews as apostates doomed to drift away from Judaism towards paganism of one kind or another. And of course, they denounce the state of Israel as a secular travesty. That's strange, because the Jewish religion itself provides an admirable model for a "spiritual elite", rejecting both militant proselytizing and cultish insularity in favor of the role of duty-bound "light unto the nations". If only the ultra-Orthodox were to embrace that role themselves, they could become as valuable a resource for the Jewish people as the Jewish people have proven, time and again, to be for the entire world. (3) comments Wednesday, November 05, 2008
Say you've just been elected President of the United States after campaigning on the themes of "hope" and "change". Your opponent, an aged former military pilot, had campaigned as an experienced statesman whose decisiveness contributed to a major military achievement in Iraq. But a sharp economic downturn shortly before the election made his foreign policy expertise seem somewhat irrelevant, and his Vice-Presidential choice became a national laughingstock. Meanwhile, your moderate, optimistic proposals to cut taxes for the middle class while making the rich pay their fair share, improve health care coverage, and create national service programs for young people, were attractive enough to voters to allay their doubts about your alleged radical past. (Fawning press coverage didn't hurt, either.) Now you have a solid electoral victory under your belt, as well as clear Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. What do you do next?
Well, the future is always difficult to predict, of course. But experience suggests a few do's and don'ts:
If any of you readers happen to be in this situation, I hope this list has been helpful... (4) comments Thursday, October 30, 2008
In the aftermath of the Republican electoral wipeout, conservative intellectuals will no doubt continue to busily plug their thoughtful treatises on how to resuscitate the conservative movement. That's understandable--after all, if your stock in trade is formulating and marketing partisan ideas, then it's natural to believe that the cure for what ails your party is more and better ideas.
Unfortunately for these thought-peddlers, that's simply not the way politics works. Newt Gingrich, for example, will no doubt insist that it was the collection of policy ideas known as the "Contract for America" that led to his greatest political victory, the Republican congressional sweep of 1994. Anybody remember what was in the "Contract for America"? Which parts were actually enacted into law and which never made it? Which ones actually had their intended effect? In fact, the 1994 Republican victory had nothing to do with the particular policy details of that year's Republican platform. Rather, after four decades in power, the Democrats' flaws and political missteps--corruption, arrogance, captivity to "special interests", and so on--were immediately conspicuous, whereas the party out of power had been away long enough for their roughly comparable flaws to be forgotten. Needless to say, after twelve years of Congressional dominance and eight years in the presidency, the roles are at least somewhat reversed. Barack Obama and the Democrats aren't now ascending to power with an exciting agenda of new, innovative and popular ideas that the Republicans were somehow too hidebound or ideologically blindered to embrace. Rather, they have been elected to avoid repeating, and where possible to reverse, the political and policy blunders committed by their predecessors--and that is agenda enough for any party. Of course, once they begin governing, they will accumulate their own set of missteps and unpopular actions. And astute Republicans will notice them, and add their reversal to the list of goals of the new Republican agenda. That--not the combined chin-tugging of a bunch of conservative policy wonks--is what will eventually rejuvenate the conservative movement. (0) comments Friday, July 04, 2008
Crooked Timberite and global warming zealot John Quiggin inadvertently asks a very important question: "I don’t see how AGW [anthropogenic global warming] differs [from] other examples like mainstream medicine v homeopathy and AIDS reappraisal, evolution vs creation." In other words, what is the difference between bucking the scientific consensus regarding global warming and, say, doubting that HIV causes AIDS?
The answer is quite simple, really, and has to do with the concept of parsimony in scientific theories. Pace Quiggin, what makes the HIV theory of AIDS compelling is not the overwhelming consensus of the scientific community--which is routinely wrong about all sorts of things, after all--but rather the difficulty of coming up with an alternative theory that explains the documented spectacular correlation between HIV infection and AIDS symptoms, as well as all the other evidence amassed in favor of the HIV theory. Similarly, the problem with homeopathy is not that mainstream medical opinion discounts it, but rather that accepting it requires reconciling its effectiveness with the entire body of physical, chemical and biological evidence which argues for its uselessness. (Creationism actually has the reverse problem: it's so parsimonious that it would easily "explain" anything--that is, absolutely any set of phenomena that might be observed--and therefore explains nothing.) Now, I'm no expert on climatological research, but my impression is that the consensus predictions of global warming rely on elaborate computer models that incorporate and combine all sorts of influences on climate, whose likely effect and interaction are estimated using elaborate statistical methods applied to past data. Given the complexity of these models, I would be absolutely astonished if it weren't possible to introduce extra factors, or alter the behavior of existing ones, in a way that radically changes the predicted outcomes without creating any significant inconsistencies with the known inputs. In other words, the exceedingly complex theories embodied in the current models don't offer much parsimony, and hence one can likely embrace alternative models with significantly different outcomes that are very nearly as parsimonious as the widely accepted ones. Now, perhaps I'm wrong, and the models are constructed so generally as to rule out any such alternatives. If so, though, then I would expect the claims for the models' predictions to be much stronger than I have seen--something along the lines of, "the predictions are scientifically irrefutable", or some such. More likely, they are nothing more than "best current guesses"--valuable, of course, but hardly conclusive. And skeptics of their predictions should certainly not be lumped together with doubters of various more established, more parsimony-generating scientific theories. (1) comments Wednesday, June 25, 2008
The Jerusalem Post's Caroline Glick, in typical sky-is-falling ultra-hawk fashion, has declared that defense minister Ehud Barak's enthusiasm for Israel's recent truce with Hamas has
two possible explanations. Either Barak is risking the lives of Israeli soldiers and civilians to pander to the most radical elements of Israeli society while seeking to win sympathy points from Cairo in a general election campaign, or he is gullible enough to believe that Israel's radical left and the Egyptian regime are moved by facts rather than interests.There is in fact a third, far more plausible explanation, confirmed by the subsequent deal between Labor and Kadima: Barak knows full well that an Israeli invasion of the Gaza strip is necessary and inevitable, but prefers for personal political reasons to delay it until after PM Ehud Olmert has been ousted. More than anything else, Barak wants to return to the prime ministership, and this ordering of events maximizes his chances of doing so. Consider the consequences for Barak of an immediate assault on Hamas: if the operation is a success, then Olmert will have repaired, to a large extent, one of the biggest stains on his reputation: his disastrous mismanagement of the Lebanon war in 2006, and its implications for his capacity as PM to command the nation's defenses. His credentials thus restored, he might well succeed in retaining his leadership of Kadima, and thus the prime ministership, until the next election, at which point voters favoring the current government are more likely to vote for his party than for a Labor party that has subordinated itself to his rule. Of course, the Gaza operation could also go badly, whether as a result of Olmert's meddling, Barak's errors or IDF blunders. In that case, Barak will be at least as badly tarnished by the failure as Olmert. Indeed, the latter has already proven his skill at deflecting blame for military failures onto his subordinates, and Barak would be an ideal target. Either way, then, Barak's chances of succeeding Olmert as prime minister are poor. Now consider his chances under the two new deals: after a summer of relative calm--probably punctuated by attacks from Gaza that inflame the public even more against the Olmert government--Kadima casts Olmert aside and replaces him with a relative novice, most probably Tzipi Livni. The newcomer will have to ensure the continued support of Kadima's coalition partners, of which Labor is the most important, and Barak can use this leverage to guarantee not only a Gaza invasion soon afterwards, but also plenty of freedom of action for both the IDF's military campaign and his own political campaign. If the military campaign goes well, he should be able to claim the lion's share of the credit--and if it goes badly, he's far better placed to scapegoat Olmert's more junior, less experienced successor than the wily Olmert himself. Glick is of course quite correct in one respect: Barak appears to be willing to sacrifice the lives and safety of Israeli soldiers and civilians for the sake of politics. however, his political calculations are neither naive nor deluded. They're quite subtle and deep--and if all goes according to plan, I give him tolerably good odds of succeeding. (0) comments
For some reason local Starbucks outlets are peddling copies of this novel, which is narrated by an unusually deep, insightful dog. (The advertising slogan is, "Narrator. Philosopher. Dog.") Without having read a single word, I can already write a summary review (or perhaps just a review headline): "Jonathan Livingston Beagle".
(0) comments Wednesday, April 02, 2008
The subprime mortgage crisis (useful primer here) has provoked the usual partisan reactions, with the left griping about "corporate governance" and "transparency", and the right telling everyone to just "suck it up". I fear that both sides are underestimating the severe and fundamental nature of the problem.
First, some history: in the 1970s, Western economies all seemed to be going haywire simultaneously. Inflation was running rampant, governments were running huge deficits, unemployment was skyrocketing, and the world's major economies were lurching from crisis to crisis. In retrospect (most modern economists will tell you), the problem was that the old Keynsian approach to government intervention in the economy had reached its limits. Further government spending only seemed to exacerbate inflation and deficits, without providing much of a stimulus to the economy. The problem was fixed (again, most modern economists will tell you) by governments shifting to monetarism as the new, better way to guide the economy to prosperity. What this story doesn't explain, however, is why Keynsianism, which had fueled two and a half decades of postwar prosperity, suddenly stopped working. Some economists will say that it was always too imprecise a tool, and its wielders were bound to lose control eventually. Others will say that it was "abused" by governments eager to keep the good times rolling. Like an antibiotic, the latter would explain, Keynsian pump-priming loses its effectiveness when overused unnecessarily during prosperous times, rendering it incapable of mitigating the inevitable downturn. But economies aren't bacteria. How do they become immune to economic stimuli? Why wouldn't "overuse" of Keynsian stimulus, whatever its side effects, at least succeed in its basic purpose of warding off recessions? The answer can be summed up in one word: expectations. Once enough people start assuming that the government's response to any economic slowdown will be more government borrowing and spending, they can place financial bets on that assumption. For example, they can bet that the government will ensure that lots of money remains available in the economy, and that they can therefore raise prices accordingly, or demand higher wages. As these bets pile up, they dampen the effect of the intervention they anticipate, forcing the government into an even more extreme intervention to achieve the same result--further heightening expectations for future interventions. Eventually, expectations match the government's maximum feasible effort, and all interventions fail. Only a completely new, unanticipated form of intervention can hope to work. Let us return now to the subprime crisis. In 1987, Alan Greenspan massively expanded government credit and cut federal interest rates in response to a stock market crash. He was to do this multiple times over the course of his career--in 1998, and again in 2001--in response to similar economic crises. This maneuver--which came to be known as the "Greenspan put"--was remarkably effective at mitigating the effects of economic shocks. However, it has also been blamed for the stock bubble of the late 1999s and the real estate bubble of the early 2000s. The connection between these bubbles, the policies that preceded them, and the lethal effect of expectations is nicely illustrated by the investor behavior that led to the subprime crisis. Why did so many sterling financial firms pour money into highly questionable investments based on mortgages of dubious quality? Were they fools or maniacs, caught up in some kind of frenzy? More likely, they were sensible people making a very reasonable bet: that when the bubble burst, the Federal Reserve would come to the rescue with a massive interest rate cut, and most if not all of their bubble profits would be preserved. And indeed, plenty of subprime mortgage investors, Bear Stearns notwithstanding, have ended up netting a hefty profit from this bet. Unfortunately, the bet only increased the magnitude of the crisis, while dampening the government's capacity to resolve it. The subprime-driven real estate bubble was not only far bigger than previous bubbles, thus requiring a much bigger liquidity infusion than previous ones--it also juiced the economy enough to nudge inflation upward, limiting the government's leeway to cut interest rates without triggering an inflation spiral. As in the 1970s, the reigning paradigm for government management of the economic cycle has become too predictable, and has thus lost its curative power. I don't know what the next paradigm will be, but it had better be pretty darn complicated. Financial firms have enormous analytical resources at their disposal these days, and are much better at predicting government policies than they used to be. It'll take an even more inscrutable policymaker than the famously Buddha-like Greenspan to keep them from catching on to the government's methods very quickly--and promptly undermining them. (2) comments
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